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REFOCUSING COMMONALITY:  AN 
ECONOMIC APPROACH THAT SHARES 
SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH HOWEY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is the week before Mother’s Day and while Lucas is filling up his 
coffee cup in the break room pondering whether he will get his mother 
anything this year, he overhears a co-worker excitedly talking about 
these new flowers the co-worker ordered for his mother.1  The new 
flower goes by the name Zibby Star Gazers, and a dozen currently retail 
for fifty dollars, notwithstanding ancillary filler foliage.2  Turns out, all 
the starlets in Hollywood have been spotted adorning them on the red 
carpet this season, including Lucas’s mother’s favorite actress. 
Interested, Lucas conducts a Google search, bypassing any 
Wikipedia related information, and finds a credible news source that 
discusses the Zibby Star Gazers as the hot new flower destined to 
overtake the Rose for flower supremacy in a woman’s heart.  With this 
information, Lucas phones the nearest floral shop and orders a dozen 
Zibby Star Gazers.  To his surprise, the florist informs Lucas that they 
have been sold out for weeks and recommends a dozen long stemmed 
roses for ten dollars because the demand for roses has plummeted.  After 
calling several more florists, Lucas settles for the roses. 
Several weeks later, Lucas overhears the very same co-worker 
speaking about a farm in California he invested in that provides him 
profits from the growth and subsequent sale of Zibby Star Gazer bulbs.3  
Considering how much money he lost in the recent recession, Lucas 
decides to contact the company, Triple S. Bulbs.  The company sends him 
brochures and directs him to its website, where Lucas learns the flower, 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical is loosely based on true events.  See generally MIKE DASH, 
TULIPOMANIA 1 (1999) (detailing the events that lead to the Dutch financial bubble of 1637 
involving tulip bulbs).  Tulips became increasingly popular during 1621 amongst Dutch 
society’s elite.  Id. at 175.  As a result, prices for individual tulip bulbs and bulbs by the 
pound skyrocketed before crashing in February of 1635.  Id. at 106–29.  After February of 
1635, the aggregate market value of tulip bulbs dropped to a value approximately 1–5% of 
the original aggregate.  Id. at 166.  Compare this with America’s greatest financial collapse, 
the Great Depression, which saw an aggregate market value crash that resulted in a 
remaining value of twenty percent of the original value.  Id. 
2 As demand for tulip bulbs increased, prices of tulip bulbs gradually rose to the point 
that families were exchanging their houses and farmland for a handful of tulip bulbs.  Id. at 
106–07.  At the height of the tulip boom, the price paid for one pound of average quality 
tulip bulbs equaled an average working man’s yearly salary.  Id. at 157. 
3 Such a scheme, where the investor “purchases” a lot of uncultivated land or crops and 
the promoter cultivates and distributes the crops, was the basis for the decision in SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294–96 (1946). 
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praised as the most beautiful flower made by Mother Nature, was 
recently discovered by a botanist off the coast of Bora Bora.  With the 
little research Lucas gathered, he decides to attempt to recoup his recent 
investment losses by buying into the flower bulb market.  Lucas sends 
three thousand dollars to Triple S. Bulbs, and in return, receives his 
packet of ownership information detailing the transaction.4  In exchange 
for his investment, Lucas now owns rights to receive profits from the 
cultivation and distribution of bulbs farmed on a small parcel of land he 
“purchased.”  Triple S. Bulbs will handle aspects of the business and 
Lucas’s profits will be derived solely from his parcel. 
Unfortunately, the information about the botanist discovering the 
Zibby Star Gazer is misleading.  A national news syndicate runs a story 
about how Zibby Star Gazers are really man-made in laboratories that 
test chemicals on animals.  As a result, the Screen Actors Guild issues a 
statement requiring all members of Hollywood’s elite to cease their love 
affair with Zibby Star Gazers immediately.  Within hours, demand for 
the once cherished flower wilts away.  Lucas’s investment is now 
worthless. 
Although this story may seem far-fetched, outlandish investment 
schemes have existed for centuries.5  Moreover, the number of new 
predatory investment schemes tends to increase after times of war and 
economic hardship.6  To combat these fraudulent practices, Congress 
created a federal system that mandates disclosure and regulates the 
exchange of securities.7  Although the law was designed to be broad in 
its authority, courts have struggled to define what precisely constitutes a 
security as it relates to nontraditional investment schemes.8 
                                                 
4 Typical investment schemes tempt investors with a small requisite investment price 
and easy access to the scheme.  See DASH, supra note 1, at 112 (discussing how the tulip bulb 
schemes of the 1630s required little money, in relation to other investment schemes of the 
time, and access to such schemes was relatively easy for novice investors).  For interested 
persons, one need only visit the local floral nursery to purchase tulip bulbs as many new 
nurseries opened to accommodate the demand.  Id. 
5 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 5 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 
LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION] (quoting STEPHEN KILLIK, THE WORK OF THE 
STOCK EXCHANGE 12 (2d ed. 1934)).  In the late seventeenth century, thousands of people 
invested in companies for which they had no idea what type of business the company 
conducted.  Id. 
6 See K. FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 3 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing the 
optimism of investors after WWI and WWII and how new investment schemes were 
regularly introduced). 
7 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
8 See infra Part II.C (discussing the cases that started securities law jurisprudence). 
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Under relevant jurisprudence, a nontraditional investment scheme is 
classified as a security if it qualifies as an “investment contract.”9  
However, investment contract analysis often turns on whether the 
investment scheme in question qualifies as a “common enterprise” under 
the applicable commonality test.10  Since 1964, courts have disagreed on 
the appropriate definition of a common enterprise and have created 
competing tests.11  To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to 
resolve the issue of defining “commonality.”12  Although recent trends 
suggest courts are acquiescing to the inconsistencies surrounding the 
existence of multiple tests, the legal field will likely relive the confusion 
surrounding the current commonality tests given society’s passion for 
taking greater risks after times of economic hardship.13 
This Note chronicles the circumstances that gave rise to the 
conflicting commonality tests and presents a solution that is rigid 
enough to provide guidance, but also workable enough to be utilized in 
an ever changing financial environment.  Part II looks at the historical 
repetition of financial collapses, subsequent government regulation, and 
commonality jurisprudence.14  In Part III, this Note analyzes the three 
different commonality tests and their respective strengths and 
weaknesses.15  Next, Part IV proposes a return to the original intent of 
                                                 
9 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297–302 (1946) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (creating the landmark test for what is considered an investment contract); see also 
infra Part II.D (discussing this test in detail). 
10 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
11 See infra Part II.E (outlining the three tests that circuits have devised to analyze and 
define commonality); see also infra Part II.F (summarizing each circuit’s preferred 
commonality test). 
12 See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1985), denying cert. to 686 F.2d 815 (9th 
Cir. 1982).  Although the majority did not voice its reasoning for denying certiorari, Justice 
White dissented and highlighted contradictory holdings from various circuits to argue that 
the Supreme Court should have resolved the circuit split.  Id. at 1116–17 (White, J., 
dissenting); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391 (2004) (analyzing whether an 
investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can qualify as an investment contract 
under the Howey test without discussing, in depth, the commonality element). 
13 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:  A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES 85 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that America’s prosperous times of the late 
1990s produced many subsequent “scams, swindles, frauds, or actions of bad judgment”).  
The author provides historical examples of investors taking greater chances during times of 
over inflated markets followed by the subsequent economic recovery period.  Id. at 223–32; 
see also GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES 151 (Vintage Books 2008) (noting 
the economic phenomenon that occurs when industry creates a limited number of risk 
products available to investors, which inadvertently encourages investors to seek excessive 
risk-taking). 
14 See infra Part II (providing a historical perspective as a foundation for analyzing the 
three commonality tests). 
15 See infra Part III (examining the strengths and weaknesses of each commonality test). 
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Howey by abandoning the current tests’ fundamental focus and applying 
an economic-based standard.16  Finally, Part V of this Note applies the 
proposed standard to the hypothetical presented above in the hope that 
Lucas will be able to recover his failed investment.17 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1933, American financial markets were regulated on a state-
by-state basis.18  Spurred by the Great Depression, Congress passed 
legislation to regulate the financial markets at the federal level after 
learning just how powerful and widespread the depression’s effects were 
on the nation.19  Even after legislation defined which investment schemes 
and markets were regulated, questions arose regarding whether certain 
nontraditional investment schemes were covered.20  The U.S. Supreme 
Court created a four-pronged test to handle non-traditional investment 
schemes, but the commonality requirement within that test only served 
to further confuse participants in the financial markets and the courts 
that adjudicated their grievances.21  To better understand the current 
state of commonality jurisprudence, it is helpful to examine the historical 
events that led to the need for federal regulation. 
A. Historical Synopsis of Economic Conditions Demanding Regulation 
There exists a general misconception that securities regulation in the 
United States began with the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).22  In 
fact, dating as far back as 1285, King Edward I laid the foundation for 
                                                 
16 See infra Part IV (promoting an economic-based commonality test). 
17 See infra Part V (attempting to vindicate, if appropriate, the character in the 
introductory hypothetical). 
18 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 11–12 
(5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS] (acknowledging that before 
the enactment of the 1933 Act, securities were governed by individual state legislatures). 
19 See infra Part II.B (outlining Congress’s first attempt to regulate securities on a federal 
level). 
20 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (noting that the 1933 Act and any 
relevant legislative history do not provide a definition for “the term ‘investment 
contract’”). 
21 See id. at 298–99 (declaring that “an investment contract for purposes of the Securities 
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 
third party”); see also Part II.D (compartmentalizing the Howey test into four elements). 
22 See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3 (specifying that rather than being the starting point for 
securities regulation in the United States, the financial collapse of 1929 coupled with the 
hardships endured in the 1930s acted more like the tipping point in a long line of financial 
disarray).  Thus, the financial collapse was more of a catalyst, which solidified the need for 
regulation more so than the original ingredient.  Id. 
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modern day securities laws when he attempted to control failing 
financial markets by requiring licenses for brokers located in London.23  
Thereafter, in 1696, Parliament not only required licensing for brokers, 
but also mandated the first recording system for financial market 
transactions in England.24  It was not until 1720 that England passed its 
first comprehensive piece of securities legislation.25  The legislation was 
enacted in response to “The South Sea Bubble,” which, like modern day 
financial market bubbles, was caused by an inflated market value with a 
deficiency in valuable underlying assets to match the valuation.26 
American securities regulation began to take shape during the 
Nineteenth Century when Congress grew concerned about the need to 
issue federal licenses to companies that operated in interstate 
commerce.27  In 1902, the Industrial Commission suggested to Congress 
that there was a pressing need for uniform regulation with respect to 
securities; however, Congress ignored the recommendations.28  
Meanwhile, state governments took it upon themselves to protect the 
citizens of their sovereigns by enacting what later became known as 
                                                 
23 See id. at 2 (quoting STEPHEN KILLIK, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 12 (2d ed. 
1934)). 
24 See id. at 3–4 (describing how Parliament passed a statute penalizing unlicensed 
trading, required a recording system for every transaction, and set a limit on commissions 
at one half of one percent).  Parliament was compelled to enact the statute because it felt 
that the privileges given to investment promoters were being abused for profit at the 
expense of “ignorant [m]en, drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised and artfully spread 
concerning the thriving [s]tate of their [s]tock.”  Id.  (quoting 11 PARL. HIST. ENG. 595 
(1696)). 
25 See id. at 2.  After several years of relaxed regulatory oversight of England’s financial 
markets, the country experienced a bursting bubble market effect and passed what has 
become known as the Bubble Act of 1720.  Id. 
26 See id. at 4 (summarizing the story of The South Sea Bubble, which occurred when the 
British Government granted a trading monopoly to both the Mississippi Company and the 
South Sea Company).  The two companies had exclusive rights to the trading, which 
occurred between South America and the British.  Id.  With the monopoly in hand and 
apparently feeling generous, leaders of the two companies attempted to pay off the public 
debt of both France and England.  Id.  However, the economy fell under financial stress 
throughout Europe causing the value of the two shipping companies to sink.  Id.  From July 
of 1720 to December of that same year, the value of the South Sea Company fell from over 
£1,000 to just £125.  See generally MALCOLM BALEN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA 
BUBBLE:  THE WORLD’S FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL SCANDAL 1 (2003) (taking an in-depth look 
behind the story summarized by Professor Loss). 
27 SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3. 
28 See id. (suggesting that the financial climate was not right for a change and that 
Congress was not inclined to act until it was forced to by a serious financial plight).  The 
Commission suggested mandatory disclosure rules and annual financial reports.  Id.  
During the two decades after the Industrial Commission’s findings, three separate bills 
were introduced to Congress to implement the suggestions.  Id.  None of these bills made it 
to the House or Senate.  Id. 
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“blue sky” laws.29  In 1911, Kansas instituted the first of these laws and 
within two years, twenty-two other states passed similar laws designed 
to regulate the sale of securities.30  With many states passing their own 
versions of securities regulations, the world of securities transactions 
was inconsistent from one state to another.31  Unfortunately, the 
inadequacy of blue sky state laws and their inability to curb fraudulent 
investment practices contributed to the Great Depression, and 
ultimately, the need for federal regulation of securities.32 
B. The 1933 Act 
“[T]he Roaring Twenties” is a catchy phrase that has been used to 
describe a time in American history when the post-war economy grew 
fast and society’s appetite for money grew even faster.33  To fuel this 
                                                 
29 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:   AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
CORPORATIONS 404 (7th ed. 2009) (suggesting the name “‘blue sky’” came “from the claim 
that such [state laws] protect[ed] investors from ‘speculative schemes which have no more 
basis than so many feet of “blue sky”’” (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 
(1917))).  But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 9–10 (offering the idea 
that the name “blue sky” came from the notion that “promoters . . . ‘would sell building 
lots in the blue sky in fee simple’” (quoting Thomas Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 
37 (1916))); Nathan W. Drage, Are Limited Partnership Interests Securities?  A Different 
Conclusion Under the California Limited Partnership Act, 18 PAC. L.J. 125, 129 (1986) 
(suggesting the name “‘blue sky’” actually came from state laws that were designed to 
protect farmers in Kansas from being sold their very own piece of the great blue sky). 
30 SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3; see KLEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 404 (noting that state blue 
sky laws were limited in their jurisdiction to the state border).  The author also points out 
that many of the states that implemented “blue sky law[s]” actually had limited resources 
to enforce them.  Id. at 404.  Also, presumably to attract business, states often included 
special interest exemptions.  Id. 
31 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 11–12 (noting the diversity 
amongst state securities laws before unification was introduced). 
32 Philip A. Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 216–17 (1959). 
33 See Richard B. Freeman, Reforming the United States’ Economic Model After the Failure of 
Unfettered Financial Capitalism, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 704 (2010) (using “[R]oaring 
[T]wenties” when describing the parallels between the behavior exhibited today by high 
level executives and other participants in securities markets as compared to the 1920s); 
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 827, 849 
(2009) (identifying the 1920s as “the Roaring Twenties” while describing the period as a 
time when the general investor was not content with simply doubling his or her money).  
See generally Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room:  How Wall 
Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 175, 198–99 (2010) (utilizing the classic phrase “Roaring Twenties” when 
discussing the effect of gender bias in the field of securities); Daniel J. Morrissey, The 
Securities Act at its Diamond Jubilee:  Renewing the Case for a Robust Registration Requirement, 
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 755 (2009) (referencing the 1920s as “the [R]oaring [T]wenties” and 
as the decade when the stock market rose steadily while cries for federal securities 
regulation went unheeded). 
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demand, more than fifty billion dollars worth of new securities were 
introduced in the United States.34  To capitalize on this increase, 
investment promoters devised techniques to profit from the abuse of the 
free market system.35  Several common abusive techniques included 
wash sales, issuing false and misleading financial statements, excessively 
buying “on margin,” and the misuse of inside information by corporate 
officers.36  All of these practices positioned the promoter or corporate 
officer to take advantage of the volatile stock price created by his own 
malfeasance by purchasing low and selling high before the price fell back 
down.37 
As it turns out, over half of the fifty billion dollars worth of new 
securities proved to be worthless.38  Before the depression, the aggregate 
worth of all securities listed on the national exchange markets equaled 
eighty-nine billion dollars.39  After the stock market crash, the aggregate 
value of stock in the country fell to fifteen billion dollars.40  Seeking 
solutions to compliment Roosevelt’s New Deal, Congress investigated 
the reasons behind the catastrophic failure of the stock market and 
discovered that the lack of oversight in the securities markets directly 
caused the depression.41 
The solution Congress crafted came in the form of a federal system 
capable of tracking securities, and it implemented requirements 
designed to curb the kinds of fraudulent practices that ruined the 
national economy in the previous decade.  On May 27, 1933, Congress 
passed the 1933 Act.42  The main purpose of the 1933 Act was to protect 
                                                 
34 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
35 Cf. SEC, 25TH ANNUAL REPORT XV–XVII (1959) (providing valuable information 
regarding the need for and subsequent organization of the SEC). 
36 See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing various types of abusive techniques).  Wash 
sales occurred when investors would successively buy and then sell the same security 
repeatedly to create a false demand, and thus drive the price up.  Id.  One is said to buy “on 
margin” when they finance their speculative investment with excessive credit as opposed 
to the typical cash or cash equivalent.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2. 
39 See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the beginning of the market collapse in the 
fall of 1929). 
40 See id. (detailing the rise and fall of the aggregate value of stock in the United States).  
In the fall of 1929 alone, the market fell $18,000,000,000.  Id.  After a short false recovery, the 
market then declined over the course of two and a half years until 1932.  Id.  The total 
amount of the collapse was a staggering $74,000,000,000, eighty-seven percent % of the 
aggregate market value before the collapse.  Id. 
41 See Loomis, supra note 32, at 216–17 (discussing Congress’s investigation behind the 
cause of the Great Depression). 
42 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
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the market and investors from fraudulent practices by requiring the full 
disclosure of all material relevant information.43 
The immediate effect of the 1933 Act was felt by all persons who 
dealt in the securities industry.  The 1933 Act requires all investment 
products that do not qualify for exempt status to be registered before 
such products can be sold to investors.44  To further Congress’s aim of 
providing investors with adequate information to aid their potential 
decisions, promoters must provide an accurate prospectus free of 
misrepresentations prior to the sale of a new investment product.45  
However, both the legal and business communities still struggled to 
determine if unique, less traditional investment schemes fell within the 
scope of the 1933 Act. 
C. Defining a Security 
The 1933 Act defines “security” by enumerating traditional products, 
such as stocks and bonds, as well as including several nontraditional 
products like “investment contracts.”46  The subsequent enactment of the 
                                                 
43 Id. § 77e–j; Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933).  
Stating:   
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of 
unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through 
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the 
investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest 
presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities 
offered to the public through crooked promotion . . . . 
Id.; see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (recognizing that exemptions 
such as the private offering exemption apply to investors who are in need of protection and 
not to investors who have access to information); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 
F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the private offering exemption allows a 
promoter to avoid the 1933 Act’s registration and disclosure regulations if he is dealing in 
close relationship with his investors); Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (holding that the private offering exemption applies if an investor has a close 
relationship with the promoter—employment, family, superior bargaining power). 
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (outlining the requirements that must be met before a financial 
transaction can be classified as exempt); id. § 77e (requiring registration before the sale of a 
security); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating the 1933 and 1934 
Acts “protect investors against fraud”); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 953 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (“[T]he spirit and purpose of . . . the 1933 Act . . . is ‘to protect investors by 
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment 
decisions.’” (quoting Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124)); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 
283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (explaining that the 1934 Act protects investors).  But 
see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (explaining that the antifraud 
protections are not unlimited). 
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77q. 
46 Id. § 77b(a)(1).  The 1933 Act’s definition for “security”:   
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
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Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) also uses the phrase “investment 
contract” when defining “security”; however, because slightly different 
terms are used, some confusion arose as to which definition should be 
applied.47  For the sake of clarity, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 
subtle difference and held that the phrase “security” within each statute 
was, in effect, the same.48 
It is commonly understood that investment products explicitly listed 
in the 1933 Act generally fall within the ambit of the 1933 Act.49  
                                                                                                             
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable 
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit 
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any 
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any 
of the foregoing. 
Id. 
47 Id. § 78c(a)(10).  The 1934 Act’s definition of “security”:   
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or 
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on 
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in 
general, any instrument commonly known as a “security”; or any 
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any 
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a 
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, 
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of 
which is likewise limited. 
Id. 
48 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1967) (finding that the definition of 
“security” found in the 1933 Act is “virtually identical” to the definition found in the 1934 
Act). 
49 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).  The Court recognized 
that Congress had not created a definition generally applicable to a wide range of 
investment schemes.  Id.  Rather, Congress simply enumerated known investment schemes 
they wished to be covered by the Acts.  Id.  Most of the investment schemes listed in the 
definition were “pretty much standardized and the name alone carries well settled 
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Congress solidified this concept by including the phrase “or 
instrument[s] commonly known as a ‘security.’”50  Therefore, it is 
understood that traditional investment products, which automatically 
qualify as securities, need no definition because their characteristics are 
self-evident.51  However, Congress failed to provide any definition for 
“[t]he term ‘investment contract.’”52 
D. The Landmark Howey Test 
It quickly became apparent in cases involving nontraditional 
investment schemes that there was a need to define an investment 
contract.  Noting the Congressional intent behind the 1933 Act, courts 
subsequently interpreted investment contracts as a catch-all phrase 
designed to bring within its authority more types of creative investment 
schemes, as opposed to limiting the phrase’s reach.53  Although the 
Court had several opportunities to define what constitutes an investment 
contract, it was not until the Court’s holding in SEC v. Howey that the 
business and legal communities received concrete direction.54 
The case before the Howey Court concerned a company that sold 
small plots of land that, when harvested, yielded citrus fruits for 
distribution.55  In addition to the simple real estate transaction, 
                                                                                                             
meaning.  Others are of more variable character and were necessarily designated by more 
descriptive terms, such as . . . ‘investment contract’ . . . .”  Id. at 351; see also 14 WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6833 (Rev. vol. 
2012) (acknowledging that the specific types of securities listed in the 1933 Act are well-
settled as being common, while on the other hand, untraditional financial instruments and 
business schemes are uncommon and fall under investment contract). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
51 See FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 6833 (recognizing that Congress did not need to 
elaborate on certain types of securities). 
52 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(noting the void in the legislative record regarding a definition for “investment contract”). 
53 See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing that Congress 
included catch-all phrases in the definition of a security to cover financial instruments and 
business schemes not easily classified within traditional categories of securities); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933) (noting the definition of security is broad enough to bring 
various investments within the traditional scope of a security); Bradley D. Johnson, Note, 
Discretionary Commodity Accounts as Securities:  An Application of the Howey Test, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 643 (1984) (discussing how the Howey test’s flexible approach is in 
synch with Congressional intent to make investment contracts a catch-all phrase). 
54 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99 (proclaiming the first definition for an investment 
contract as a “scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is 
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”). 
55 See id. at 295–96 (explaining the business structure involved in the case).  The 
promoter, W.J. Howey, consisted of two separate corporations.  Id.  W.J. Howey and 
Company owned the real estate on which the citrus groves were planted, while Howey-in-
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purchasers also entered into a contract, which gave the company full 
discretion and authority over the harvesting, marketing, and the 
subsequent sale of yielded citrus fruits.56  The deal entitled the purchaser 
to a portion of the entire enterprise’s net profits in exchange for 
monetary investment in the company’s citrus business.57  Given the 
unique business model, the Court analyzed the facts to determine if it 
could be considered an investment contract, and therefore, a security 
subject to the regulations of the 1933 Act.58 
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that Congress had 
provided little guidance in its legislative history as to what it meant by 
the phrase investment contract.59  However, the Court identified existing 
blue sky laws, which had incorporated the phrase “investment contract” 
into their securities analysis.60  Therefore, Congress merely solidified the 
phrase in the 1933 Act, and the Court could use state law precedent to 
derive the meaning of investment contracts.61  As a result, the Court 
articulated a four-pronged test for determining an investment contract:  
(1) an investment of money; (2) into a common enterprise; (3) with the 
expectation of profiting; (4) solely from the efforts of the enterprise’s 
promoter or a third party.62  The Court then applied this newfound test 
                                                                                                             
the-Hills Service engaged in cultivating the citrus groves and marketing the crops.  Id.  On 
a yearly basis, approximately five hundred acres of citrus groves were planted.  Id. 
56 See id. at 295–97 (noting that it was the company’s practice to lure vacationers from the 
adjacent resort, which the company also owned, to sell the out-of-state residents on the 
idea of investing in an effortless investment). 
57 See id. at 295–96 (noting the company annually planted 250 acres of citrus for its own 
use and sold the remaining 250 acres to the public to finance additional development).  
Investors could expect a ten percent annual return over a ten year period.  Id.  “[I]ndividual 
development of the plots of land that . . . would seldom be economically feasible due to 
their small size.”  Id. at 300.  This is an example of economies of scale.  See RONALD C. 
FISHER, STATE & LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 121–22 (3rd ed. 2007) (defining economies of scale 
as “a decrease in average cost as the quantity of output rises” allowing “individual 
consumers can reduce their costs by sharing the good and its total cost with others”); Jack 
Alan Kramer, Vouching for Federal Educational Choice:  If You Pay Them, They Will Come, 29 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (1995) (“Economies of scale occur when the average total cost of 
producing a good or service declines as output expands.”). 
58 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297. 
59 Id. at 298.  The Court stated “[t]he term ‘investment contract’ is undefined by the 
Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports.”  Id. 
60 Id.; see State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920) (holding 
that an investment contract was “[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way 
intended to secure income or profit from its employment”). 
61 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.  The Court noted that the term investment contract had been 
steadfastly used judicially before the enactment of the 1933 Act; therefore, it can be 
reasonably inferred that the same meaning state courts used was the meaning Congress 
intended to adopt when codifying the phrase.  Id. 
62 Id. at 301. 
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to hold that the unique business model at bar was indeed a security.63  
Although the test was intended to answer the question “what is an 
investment contract,” it actually added to the confusion by not 
specifying the requirements for a common enterprise.64 
E. Subsequent Creation of the Commonality Tests 
The common enterprise element of the Howey test has begotten three 
subtests, which appear minutely different; yet, the differences can have 
dramatic effects when analyzing an investment product to determine if it 
is a security.65  Compared to the other three elements of Howey, the 
divide among the circuits as to how the common enterprise element 
should be interpreted is understandable given the nature of the words 
used.66  There is little dispute when attempting to interpret investment of 
money, expectation of profits, or efforts of others.67  However, the notion 
of a common enterprise, within the landscape of securities, has led 
circuits to disagree on whether the focus is between the investors 
themselves or between investors and the promoters.68  Furthermore, is it 
                                                 
63 Id. at 300. 
64 See id. at 297, 298 (recognizing that Congress did not provide a definition for 
“investment contract” and that the Court would need to create a test to decide whether the 
investment scheme at bar was a security under the 1933 Act). 
65 See infra Part II.E.1–3 (stating that when analyzing commonality, it is important to 
recognize the subtle change in the use of the word “fortunes”).  With horizontal 
commonality, the key issue focuses on whether the fortunes of each investor rise and fall 
with the fortunes of all other investors.  Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 19 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1994).  
Unlike horizontal commonality, vertical commonality shifts this question to whether the 
fortunes of each investor correlate with either the efforts or fortunes of the promoter.  Brodt v. 
Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Kosot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 
(5th Cir. 1974).  Thus, for broad vertical commonality, the fortunes of the investor must be 
tied to the efforts of the promoter.   See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (holding no commonality 
existed because strong efforts by the promoter does not necessarily equate to success for 
the investor).  But for strict vertical commonality, the focus turns on the fortunes of the 
investor as it relates to the fortunes of the promoter, instead of the efforts.  See Kosot 
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478 (focusing on the impact of the promoter’s efforts rather 
than the effort itself).  For clarity, horizontal is investor fortunes/investor fortunes; broad 
vertical is investor fortunes/promoter efforts; and strict vertical is investor 
fortunes/promoter fortunes.  Infra Part II.E. 
66 See supra note 65 (outlining the overlapping language used in the commonality test in 
an attempt to clarify the inherent confusion). 
67 See FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 6833 (recognizing that Congress did not need to 
elaborate on certain types of securities). 
68 See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d. 516, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(disagreeing with the court in Milnarik and holding that commonality turns on the degree 
of reliance an investor places on the promoter); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 
F.2d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 1972) (focusing on the relationship between the investors themselves 
by holding that “[w]e do not believe an investor who grants discretionary authority to his 
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necessary to have more than one investor involved in order for 
commonality to exist?69  When taking the broad scope of the 1933 Act 
into account, one may also question what degree of relationship between 
the promoter and investor begins to offend even the broad reading of the 
1933 Act.70  The Court bypassed several opportunities to answer these 
inquires raised by the inherent conflict within the phrase “common 
enterprise” and left it to the circuit courts to work out the proper test.71  
To date, the courts have articulated three different tests: horizontal 
commonality; broad vertical commonality; and narrow vertical 
commonality. 
1. Horizontal Commonality 
Horizontal commonality exists when the success of each individual 
investor in an enterprise is tied to the success of every other individual 
investor.72  Typically, the fortunes of each investor fluctuate in harmony 
with every investor who contributes money to the same enterprise.73  
Horizontal commonality is defined as the pooling or pro-rata 
                                                                                                             
broker thereby joins the broker’s other customers in the kind of common enterprise that 
would convert the agency relationship into a statutory security”). 
69 See James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 59, 66–67 (2011) (distinguishing horizontal commonality which “focuses on the 
horizontal relationship among investors” from the types of vertical commonality, which 
“focus[] on the vertical relationship between the investor and the promoter”); Maura K. 
Monaghan, Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion:  The Common Enterprise Element of 
Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2156 (1995) (arguing that the 
horizontal commonality test is very restrictive because it limits securities to those involving 
more than one investor at the expense of ignoring “parallel frauds,” which occurs when a 
promoter is conducting his business in a fraudulent manner with respect to each individual 
investor); see also Marc G. Alcser, Comment, The Howey Test:  A Common Ground for the 
Common Enterprise Theory, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1217, 1233–34 (1996) (discussing the 
heightened need for disclosure in situations involving only one investor). 
70 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275–76.  The court in Milnarik adamantly rejected the plaintiff’s 
position that the words in the 1933 Act should be read literally as to include the scheme in 
which the plaintiff had invested.  Id.  Instead, the court retorted “we do not believe every 
conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract 
was intended to be included within the statutory definition of a security.”  Id. 
71 See supra note 12 (discussing the reasons behind the Court’s decisions to pass upon the 
opportunity to resolve the circuit split regarding commonality).  Most notably, the Court 
denied certiorari to a case posing the specific question of commonality.  Mordaunt v. 
Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1985), denying cert. to 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982). 
72 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276. 
73 See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
horizontal commonality did not exist in a scheme involving condominium properties 
because the success of each condominium unit investment, which was owned separately, 
did not fluctuate in harmony with the success of other condominium units investments 
within the same property). 
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distribution of income derived from the operation of the enterprise, or 
the pooling or pro-rata sharing of expenses when purchasing or 
constructing an asset.74  Generally speaking, horizontal commonality can 
be shown when the success of the individual’s investment is tied to the 
success of the enterprise as a whole.75  By its very nature, horizontal 
commonality requires more than one investor be involved for a common 
enterprise to exist.76 
In its landmark opinion, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals elevated the pooling of investor’s interests 
requirement to the level of primary guidepost when it solidified its 
adherence to the horizontal commonality test.77  The investment scheme 
in Milnarik consisted of individuals that deposited money with a 
common broker, who in turn, used its own discretion to invest the 
deposited funds in various futures commodities.78  Each depositor had 
                                                 
74 See id. at 87 (noting that the pooling of assets is usually combined with the pro-rata 
distribution of profits to show horizontal commonality). 
75 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276–77. 
76 See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222–23 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding no 
horizontal commonality existed because the agreement was solely between one investor 
and one promoter as opposed to multiple investors). 
77 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276–77.  The Seventh Circuit later affirmed its stance on 
horizontal commonality when it expressly stated, “[t]his [c]ircuit has strictly adhered to a 
‘horizontal’ test of common enterprise, under which multiple investors must pool their 
investments and receive pro rata profits.”  Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 
146 (7th Cir. 1984).  The court found no horizontal commonality existed when an investor 
purchased valuable paintings from an art gallery with an attached agreement that 
obligated the gallery to purchase the artwork back within five years.  Id. at 146–47.  The 
court reasoned that the agreement contained neither pooling of funds nor pro rata sharing 
of profits.  Id.  Interestingly, the plaintiff argued in the alternative that the court should 
adopt vertical commonality instead of horizontal commonality.  Id.  The court turned down 
the invitation but still exercised the vertical commonality test to reiterate to plaintiff that he 
had no case.  Id.  It is apparent from the opinion that the court was just as interested in 
admonishing the plaintiff for bringing a nearly baseless claim as they were in reaffirming 
their unwavering devotion to horizontal commonality analysis.  Id. 
78 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275; see Curran, 622 F.2d at 220 (defining a commodity future as 
“a standardized contract for the purchase and sale of a fixed quantity of a commodity to be 
delivered in a specified future month at a price agreed upon when the contract is entered 
into”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006), for the definition of “commodity”:   
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, 
rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum 
tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including 
lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats 
and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean 
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange 
juice, and all other goods and articles, except onions as provided in 
section 13-1 of this title, and all services, rights, and interests in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in. 
Id. 
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an individual contract with the common broker and was entitled to 
receive profits derived from their funds alone.79  In exchange, the broker 
retained a commission from any profits manufactured via the 
speculative trading.80  Citing previous Seventh Circuit precedent, the 
Milnarik court held that this type of investment scheme was not an 
investment contract under the 1933 Act because the success and failure 
of each investor did not impact the success of other investors who also 
had agreements with the common broker.81 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Milnarik, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals accepted the horizontal commonality test when it faced 
a similar fact pattern involving futures commodities.82  In Curran v. 
Merrill Lynch, the court also focused on the pooling of investor’s interests 
while at the same time expressly denouncing the vertical commonality 
test.83  The court recognized that situations can arise where the 
underlying product involved, in this case futures commodities, may not 
be securities, but the overarching investment scheme may still satisfy 
Howey’s requirement.84 
Two years later, in yet another case involving discretionary futures 
commodities and Merrill Lynch, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
followed suit and illustrated the high level of acceptance the pooling of 
investor’s interest requirement had achieved.85  Treating the requirement 
as the fulcrum in horizontal commonality analysis, Judge Hunter, in one 
sentence of reasoning, found that the discretionary accounts involved 
did not exhibit the requisite characteristics of an investment contract.86 
2. Broad Vertical Commonality 
Instead of examining the synergy between investors’ fortunes, 
vertical commonality generally shifts the focus to the relationship 
                                                 
79 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275.  Commodities themselves are not securities.  Curran, 622 F.2d 
at 221.  However, courts have determined that when commodity accounts are managed by 
a third party on behalf of an investor, the agreement between the investor and the 
promoter—in this case the commodity account manager—is an investment contract.  Id.  
Thus, as an investment contract, it is subject to regulation under the 1933 Act.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(a)(1) (2006). 
80 Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275. 
81 Id. at 276. 
82 Curran, 622 F.2d at 222. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.; see  SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d. 516, 520 n.9 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting 
the distinction between an underlying product not being a security, but the overarching 
scheme designed to invest in such products for the production of money may be a 
security). 
85 Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982). 
86 Id. 
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between the individual investor and the promoter of the investment 
product.87  More specifically, broad vertical commonality looks closely at 
the relationship between the promoters’ efforts in conjunction with the 
investors’ fortunes.88  Courts that follow horizontal commonality are 
quick to point out that shifting the analysis from the relationship 
between investors’ fortunes to the relationship between investors’ 
fortunes and the promoter’s efforts, blends the second and fourth prongs 
of Howey.89  Consequently, a lower standard for commonality is created 
in comparison to the horizontal commonality test.90 
One of the earliest cases developing the foundation for broad vertical 
commonality came out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case 
that involved the resale of second trust deeds and second mortgages.91  
The Ninth Circuit held that such investments met the commonality 
element of Howey, and thus qualified as an investment contract because 
the fortunes of the investors were “inextricably woven” with the efforts 
of the promoter, not that of other investors.92  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
                                                 
87 See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (declaring the 
most important factor in vertical commonality is “the uniformity of impact of the 
promoter’s efforts” on the investor’s fortune).  The court in Koscot Interplanetary went on to 
interpret Howey as applying a form of vertical commonality.  Id.  Its interpretation centered 
around the notion that investors only bought into the investment scheme in Howey because 
of their ability to rely on the management company to produce profits.  Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that by 
allowing commonality to be satisfied by showing the fortunes of the investor are tied to the 
efforts of the promoter, the second and fourth prongs are simply combined into one 
question); Berman v. Bache, 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio 1979); see also supra Part II.D 
(stating the fourth prong evaluates the nature of the effort the promoter must put forth in 
order for the investors to make their intended profit); infra Part III.B (explaining if the 
commonality prong also incorporates an analysis of the promoter’s efforts, a degree of 
redundancy can be found). 
90 See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 5 (4th ed. 2011) 
(describing the more restrictive requirements for horizontal commonality and the less 
restrictive requirements for strict vertical commonality and broad vertical commonality); 
Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What is a Common Enterprise?  Horizontal and Vertical 
Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 329–30 (1989) 
(considering strict vertical commonality to be less restrictive than horizontal commonality 
but more restrictive than broad vertical commonality); see also, Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 
560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed 
strict vertical commonality, but not to the full exclusion of horizontal commonality). 
91 See L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960) (laying 
down the foundational reasoning for the subsequent development of the broad vertical 
commonality test). 
92 Id.  
We find ‘a common enterprise’ in which the appellants and the 
purchasers of second trust deed notes have an economic 
interest . . . [that] is inextricably woven with the ability of [the 
promoter] to locate by the exercise of its independent judgment a 
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Appeals, widely credited with creating broad vertical commonality, 
relied on the same reasoning when it derived the broad vertical 
commonality test.93 
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., the Fifth Circuit applied the 
broad vertical commonality test to a case involving a pyramid scheme.94  
The Koscot Interplanetary court held that the critical element of the scheme 
providing commonality was similar to the citrus grove scheme in Howey 
in that each individual participant’s fortunes were dependent upon the 
efforts of the promoter.95  If there was any question as to whether the 
                                                                                                             
sufficient number of discounted trust deeds, and the ability of [the 
promoter] to subsequently meet its commitments . . . . 
Id.  This language actually speaks to both the efforts and the fortunes of the promoter as they 
relate to individual investors.  Id.  As such, it subsequently became the basis for both broad 
and strict vertical commonality.  See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478 (formulating 
broad vertical commonality); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 
(9th Cir. 1973) (adopting strict vertical commonality). 
93 Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478; see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 
222 (6th Cir. 1980) (denouncing broad vertical commonality).  While adopting horizontal 
commonality, the court made it a point to expressly disassociate with the broad vertical 
commonality test by stating, “we necessarily reject the vertical commonality approach 
primarily championed by the Fifth Circuit’s decision . . . .”  Id.; see also Meredith v. 
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. 79-1282, 1980 WL 1465, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1980) 
(acknowledging that the vertical commonality requirement was championed primarily by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
94 See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 475 (describing how a pyramid scheme 
works).  The scheme in Koscot Interplanetary consisted of a structured hierarchy that 
rewarded larger profits as a participant ascended through the ranks.  Id.  At the bottom of 
the pyramid structure, numerous entry-level “beauty advisor[s]” could invest in the 
scheme for the right to purchase cosmetic products at a forty-five percent discount, and 
then sell those products on margin for a profit.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  If a 
participant wished, they could elevate to the second level of the pyramid and become a 
“supervisor or retail manager.”  Id.  At the second level, the participant had to make an 
investment of $1,000 in exchange for a greater discount on the same cosmetic products, 
usually fifty-five percent, and then the participant could increase their profit potential.  Id.  
Additionally, any participant on the second level could recruit a first level “beauty 
advisor” and receive an additional $600.  Id.  The highest level was that of a distributor, at 
which point, discounts reached sixty-five percent.  Id.  Plus, the distributor received $600 or 
$3,000 for each recruit they brought into the Koscot Interplanetary scheme.  Id.  The scheme 
rewarded those who could recruit and retain subordinate participants and promoted the 
scheme in a veil of secrecy.  Id. 
95 See id. at 478. (giving a broad characterization to the investment scheme in Howey by 
saying the only way an individual investor’s fortunes were tied to other investors’ fortunes, 
were through the generalization that each investor would prosper if the whole enterprise 
prospered).  Such a generalization would give rise to horizontal commonality, but because 
of the court reading the Howey facts as individual investors receiving profits in relation to 
their individual plot, vertical commonality can be derived therein.  See SEC v. W.J. Howey 
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (stating that each investor’s “respective shares in th[e] 
enterprise [were] evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a 
convenient method of determining the investors’ allocable shares of the profits”). 
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Fifth Circuit would adhere to broad vertical commonality, it was put to 
rest just two days later when it decided SEC v. Continental Commodities 
Corp.96  The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Milnarik, which solidified horizontal commonality.97  
Instead, the Third Circuit held the exact opposite, claiming that the 
Milnarik view was incompatible with views of the Supreme Court.98  
Distinguishing itself from Milnarik, the court furthered the notion that a 
promoter’s expertise is a key factor to consider when evaluating the 
promoter’s efforts.99 
Through the interpretations rendered by both the Ninth Circuit and 
the Fifth Circuit, it is clear that in order for broad vertical commonality to 
exist, the fortunes of the investor must be directly tied to the efforts of 
the promoter.100  Those efforts can be evidenced by a showing that the 
investor relied on a high level of promoter expertise in the industry for 
which the investor placed his money.101 
3. Strict Vertical Commonality 
Strict vertical commonality is distinguishable from broad vertical 
commonality in that the former shifts the focal point from the efforts of 
the promoter to the fortunes of the promoter.102  Thus, the commonality 
                                                 
96 Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 473; SEC v. Continental Commoditie Corp., 497 
F.2d 516, 516 (5th Cir. 1974).  Koscot Interplanetary was decided on July 15, 1974.  497 F.2d at 
473.  Continental Commodities was decided on July 17, 1974.  497 F.2d at 516. 
97 Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 522 (defining the key question to whether the investors’ success is dependent 
upon the promoter’s expertise because the investors lack the necessary expertise to produce 
the profits they seek); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 142 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining 
that an investor can meet the broad vertical commonality test if he lacks knowledge or 
expertise of the investment scheme). 
100 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. 
SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960)); see also Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522 
(defining the key question to whether the investors’ success is dependent upon the 
promoter’s expertise because the investors lack the necessary expertise to produce the 
profits they seek). 
101 See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522 (finding an investment contract because 
the investors lacked the necessary business skills to handle such accounts, and therefore 
must rely heavily on the expertise of the promoter). 
102 Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); see SEC v. R.G. Reynolds 
Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that because the promoter’s 
fortunes were contingent upon the fortunes of his investors, vertical commonality existed 
and the second prong of Howey was satisfied); DAVID BARROWS & JOHN SMITHIN, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS FOR BUSINESS 22–26, 66–67 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that a 
promoter utilizing a flat rate commission structure would demand an amount roughly 
equal to that which the promoter would garner under a percentage based commission 
structure). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/10
2012] Refocusing Commonality 675 
element is met when an investor’s fortune fluctuates in harmony with 
the promoter’s fortunes.103  This is not to be confused with horizontal 
commonality because, under that analysis, the focus would be an 
investor’s fortune versus other individual investors’ fortunes.104  Unlike 
horizontal commonality, strict vertical commonality allows for an 
investment scheme to exist even if there is only one investor.105  Strict 
vertical commonality carries a slightly greater standard than its next in 
kin, broad vertical commonality, but still a much lower standard than 
horizontal commonality.106 
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals laid the foundation for 
vertical commonality in general, it has followed strict vertical 
commonality in subsequent cases.107  Most notably, the Ninth Circuit 
applied strict vertical commonality to an investment scheme involving 
discretionary commodities trading accounts.108  The court held the 
investment scheme was not an investment contract, and thus not a 
security because there lacked a correlation between the success of the 
                                                 
103 See SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that strict 
commonality existed because both the investor and the promoter shared the risk of profits 
and losses in the same enterprise). 
104 See supra Part II.E.1 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of horizontal 
commonality). 
105 See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (accepting the proposition that 
commonality is required between the investor and the promoter, not multiple investors). 
106 See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining that horizontal 
commonality requires “multiple investors and a sharing or pooling of funds,” making it 
more restrictive than strict vertical commonality, which requires a linking of investors’ and 
promoters’ fortunes or broad vertical commonality, which only requires a linking of 
efforts); Crook, supra note 90, at 329–30 (considering strict vertical commonality to be less 
restrictive than horizontal commonality, but more restrictive than broad vertical 
commonality). 
107 L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 165 (9th Cir. 1960); see SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (pulling language from 
L.A. Trust Deed).  But see Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating 
that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed strict vertical commonality, but not to 
the full exclusion of horizontal commonality). 
108 Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978).  The investment scheme in 
Brodt is the same type of investment scheme analyzed by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  Id.  However, the Seventh Circuit used horizontal commonality to find no 
investment contract existed since the fortunes of the investors did not rise and fall together 
in harmony.  See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(adopting horizontal commonality).  Brodt is a good illustration of how courts can use any 
of the three commonality tests to analyze the same type of investment scheme and still 
reach the same conclusion.  595 F.2d at 460; see also Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 
F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984) (illustrating an investment scheme that fails multiple 
commonality tests and as such, is not a security). 
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investor and the success of the promoter.109  Furthermore, the court took 
the added step of clarifying any confusion regarding whether or not an 
investment scheme must have an element of substantial risk of loss to 
meet the commonality requirement.110  Apparently recognizing a rising 
use of the substantial risk test, the court rejected such a requirement and 
thus limited the analysis to the relationship between the fortunes of the 
investor and the fortunes of the promoter.111 
F. Summary of the Circuit Split 
To date, the horizontal commonality test has been adopted and 
regularly used by the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.112  Broad 
vertical commonality is mostly confined to the Fifth Circuit.113  The 
Eighth Circuit favors vertical commonality; however, it is unclear 
                                                 
109 Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.  The court noted that the promoter could still reap large 
commissions and be considered successful while the investor actually loses his investment.  
Id.  If, however, the promoter’s commission had been tied directly to the success or failure 
of investor’s account, the investment scheme would most likely have been considered an 
investment contract under strict vertical commonality.  Id.  For illustrative effect, such a 
scheme, where the commission of the promoter is dependent upon the success or failure of 
the investor, would likely qualify under broad vertical commonality because the investor’s 
fortunes are heavily dependent upon the efforts of the promoter to successfully invest in 
the right commodities.  See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 
1974) (finding a similar commodities trading account scheme to be an investment contract 
because the investors lacked the necessary business skills to handle such accounts, and 
therefore must rely heavily on the expertise of the promoter).  However, the investment 
scheme would still lack the requisite pooling of funds or pro-rata distribution of profits to 
qualify under horizontal commonality.  See Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275–76 (holding similar 
commodities trading accounts were not investment contracts). 
110 See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (recognizing that in a previous case, the court had 
inadvertently given greater weight to the fact that investors were not involved in a 
substantial risk of losing their money to find commonality existed); see also United States v. 
Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 563–64 (9th Cir. 1978) (neglecting the fact that no common enterprise 
existed, as defined by either vertical commonality test, the court still held a common 
enterprise was present since the investors experienced a substantial risk of loss on their 
investment).  The substantial risk of loss factor had not been present in prior commonality 
precedent, which is why the court elected to correct itself in Brodt,  595 F.2d at 461. 
111 See supra note 108 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brodt); see also supra 
note 110 (noting that the court recognized it had inadvertently bolstered the substantial risk 
test). 
112 See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982) (adopting horizontal 
commonality); see also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (dispensing 
vertical commonality in favor of horizontal commonality); Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276 
(evaluating the various commonality approaches before settling on horizontal 
commonality). 
113 See supra note 87 (discussing SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th 
Cir. 1974)). 
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whether broad vertical or strict vertical commonality is preferred.114  
Although the Ninth Circuit first laid the foundation for both broad and 
strict vertical commonality, it has since applied the strict vertical 
commonality test more often than the broad vertical commonality test.115  
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has used a combination 
of both vertical commonality tests while expressly rejecting horizontal 
commonality.116  In the Eleventh Circuit, it appears broad vertical 
commonality is favored.117  As for the remaining circuits—the First, 
Second, and Fourth Circuits—the issue has yet to be decided as all have 
declined the opportunity to clarify the matter even though the district 
courts within their circuits are inconsistent in applying one test over the 
others.118 
                                                 
114 See Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., 494 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing a Ninth 
Circuit holding, which based its decision on strict vertical commonality, even though the 
majority of reasoning focused on the efforts of the promoter:  typically indicative of broad 
vertical commonality). 
115 See supra note 91 (discussing L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 165 
(9th Cir. 1960)); see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 
1973) (pulling language from L.A. Trust Deed, 285 F.2d at 165).  But see Hocking v. Dubois, 
839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
endorsed strict vertical commonality, but not to the full exclusion of horizontal 
commonality). 
116 See McGill v. Am. Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The 
rigid ‘horizontal commonality’ requirement . . . has never been a part of the law of this 
circuit.”). 
117 Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 915 (11th Cir. 1987).  Although the court 
focused its holding on the efforts of the promoter under the fourth prong of Howey, the 
court nonetheless cited a Fifth Circuit case to help guide its decision.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit 
follows broad vertical commonality.  SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 516 
(5th Cir. 1974); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478; see also supra Part II.E.2. 
(identifying which circuits follow broad vertical commonality). 
118 See Crook, supra note 90, at 332–49 (comprising an excellent list of cases from each 
circuit court of appeals and the district courts within each circuit).  For example, within the 
First Circuit, the District of Massachusetts originally adopted horizontal commonality only 
to switch to strict vertical commonality later.  See Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826, 834 
(D. Mass. 1986) (adopting strict vertical commonality); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 
638 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D. Mass. 1985); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15–
16 (D. Mass 1981) (exclaiming a preference for horizontal commonality while still 
acknowledging that the scheme at bar would not fit horizontal or either vertical 
commonality tests).  The use of varying tests also occurs in the Second Circuit.  See In re Gas 
Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying strict vertical 
commonality); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, 618 F. Supp. 436, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(utilizing horizontal commonality).  The discrepancy between tests is evident in the Fourth 
Circuit as well.  See Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 802–03 (E.D.N.C. 
1986) (finding broad vertical commonality more persuasive); Burton v. Heinold 
Commodities, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 360, 361–62 (E.D. Va. 1986) (applying horizontal 
commonality). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Allowing three separate tests to exist offends the basic reasoning 
behind implementation of the 1933 Act.119  In theory, a financial product 
either qualifies as a security and is subject to federal regulation, or does 
not qualify and escapes such regulation.  In reality, the disagreement 
among the circuit courts causes a financial product to be classified as a 
security in one circuit while not being considered a security in others.120  
Part III analyzes the weaknesses and pitfalls of each commonality test.  
More specifically, Part III.A illustrates the overly restrictive nature of the 
horizontal commonality test used predominantly by the Third, Sixth, and 
                                                 
119 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how blue sky laws were 
inconsistent in their approaches as either pro-business or pro-investor and how such 
approaches helped fuel the need for federal securities regulation that would be more 
consistent). 
120 See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974).  Unlike the 
Seventh Circuit, the court held that a discretionary trading account in commodities futures 
was a security and thus allowed plaintiffs to continue their suit seeking damages for fraud.  
Id. at 522–23.  The court analyzed the accounts by asking whether the profits of the 
investments collectively were dependent on the promoter’s expertise and then buttressed 
its point by stating:    
[t]hat it may bear more productive fruits in the case of some options 
than it does in cases of others should not vitiate the essential fact that 
the success of the trading enterprise as a whole and customer 
investments individually is contingent upon the sagacious investment 
counseling of [the promoter]. 
Id. at 522–23; see also supra note 79 (discussing the definition of a commodities future).  But 
see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (following the Seventh 
Circuit’s lead by denouncing vertical commonality in favor of horizontal commonality to 
find that discretionary commodity trading accounts lack the requisite commonality 
demanded by the court’s reading of Howey); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 
274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a discretionary trading account in commodities 
futures was not a security, and as a result, petitioners could not recover their initial deposit 
amount of $13,662 from the promoter who fraudulently squandered it away).  The Sixth 
Circuit held that the discretionary commodity trading accounts involved were not 
investment contracts, and thus not securities.  Curran, 622 F.2d at 222.  The Sixth Circuit 
also directly attacked the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning by quoting its language in Continental 
Commodities before countering that “[a]lthough [the Fifth Circuit’s] approach has attracted 
some support, we believe that no horizontal common enterprise can exist unless there also 
exists between discretionary account customers themselves some relationship which ties 
the fortunes of each investor to the success of the overall venture.”  Id. at 223–24 (footnote 
omitted).  The Sixth Circuit felt commonality based solely on the relationship between the 
promoter and an individual investor was inconsistent with Howey.  Id.  Following this line 
of cases, an investor living in the Fifth Circuit will potentially be able to recover based on 
statutory causes of actions while an investor residing in the Sixth Circuit is barred from 
similar claims even though the underlying investment product is identical, equally as risky, 
and equally as open to fraudulent promoter deception worthy of disclosure.  See cases cited 
supra. 
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Seventh Circuits.121  Next, Part III.B discusses the repetitive requirement 
utilized by broad vertical commonality to weigh an investor’s reliance on 
the promoter’s expertise.122  Finally, Part III.C discusses strict vertical 
commonality’s departure from Howey by relying on form over substance 
and ignoring the economic realities of the given transaction.123 
A. The Overly Restrictive Horizontal Commonality Test 
Horizontal commonality requires the success of each individual to be 
tied to the success of every other individual investor in an enterprise.124  
Consequently, if an enterprise only involves one investor, that investor’s 
success can never be tied to the success of other investors as no other 
investors exist.125  As a result, investment schemes involving only one 
investor are not covered by the horizontal commonality test.126  
Commentators have argued that this fact alone is enough to characterize 
the test as overly restrictive.127  However, some investment schemes 
involving one promoter and one investor may be organized in a way that 
does not mandate the federal government’s involvement.128  The 
                                                 
121 See infra Part III.A (discussing the overly restrictive nature of horizontal 
commonality). 
122 See infra Part III.B (discussing the redundancy that is an inherent characteristic of 
broad vertical commonality). 
123 See infra Part III.C (arguing that strict vertical commonality produces inconsistent 
results). 
124 See Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[The] 
‘horizontal’ test of common enterprise . . . [is when] investors . . . pool their investments 
and receive pro rata profits.” (citing Milnarik, 457 F.2d 274)). 
125 Id. 
126 See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 225 (6th Cir. 1980) (characterizing the 
relationship between the promoter and investor as a one-on-one relationship whereby the 
investor’s monies were compartmentalized into an individual account separated from 
other investors so as to not trigger horizontal commonality). 
127 See Gordon III, supra note 69, at 91 (“[H]orizontal commonality is a restrictive test that 
excludes many instruments sold as investments.”); Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156 
(suggesting that horizontal commonality “is unduly restrictive” because it limits the types 
of investment schemes to those which include “more than one investor”); see also Alcser, 
supra note 69, at 1233–34 (discussing the heightened need for disclosure in situations 
involving only one investor based on the economic theory of diversification). 
128 See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that a relationship 
between a grain farmer, a feedlot operator, and a bank could satisfy the common enterprise 
requirement if both the farmer and the bank were dependent upon the success of the 
feedlot for generating a return on their investments).  The facts of this case are a great 
illustration of the ways in which promoters devise creative investment schemes potentially 
worthy of federal regulation.  Id. at 431.  In Hector, a grain farmer entered into an 
agreement with a feedlot and a bank.  Id.  The feedlot agreed to buy, feed, and sell cattle 
and hogs on behalf of the farmer’s account in exchange for the grain farmer supplying 
grain to the feedlot.  Id.  As such, the consideration in this agreement was a commodity as 
opposed to cash.  Id.  Additionally, the bank agreed to finance all livestock purchases by 
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following explores the requisite relationship between promoters and 
investors necessary to trigger horizontal commonality and how the test 
promotes circumvention. 
In scenarios involving transactions where the parties are closely 
acquainted, the investor presumably has a relationship with the 
promoter whereby the investor can demand the necessary information 
required to make educated decisions and evaluate for himself whether 
fraud exists in the transaction.129  In this sense, horizontal commonality is 
logical because mandating that the promoter disclose information would 
be paternalistic in such scenarios.130  If a promoter were to enter into 
multiple transactions involving closely acquainted parties of similar 
construction, the scheme would be of a different character.131  In the 
former, the investor has a more intimate relationship with the promoter 
that creates less of an opportunity for fraud.132  In the latter, the size of 
the promoter’s operation has increased, which may allow him to hide 
information from individual promoters, and thus increases the 
likelihood of fraud.133  Unfortunately, horizontal commonality would 
allow these investment schemes to go unregulated even though it 
appears to qualify as the type Congress intended to thwart by requiring 
                                                                                                             
issuing notes to the farmer with the underlying collateral being the livestock themselves.  
Id.  The arrangement in Hector would likely fail other elements of Howey, but the court 
made it clear that commonality could exist even though the investment scheme only 
involved one investor.  Id. at 433. 
129 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).  The 1933 Act allows an exemption for “transactions by an 
issuer not involving any public offering.”  Id.  This exception is known as the private 
offering exemption and allows promoters dealing in close relationship with his investors to 
forgo adherence to registration and disclosure regulations imposed by the 1933 Act.  Van 
Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989).  Courts have recognized 
that the exemption applies to investors who are in need of protection and not to investors 
who have access to such information.  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).  
However, if an investor has a close relationship with the promoter—employment, family, 
superior bargaining power—the private offering exemption does apply.  Doran v. Petrol. 
Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977). 
130 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing the purpose of the 1933 Act and 
noting that Congress intended to promote disclosure). 
131 See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(acknowledging that by engaging in similar discretionary arrangements with other 
investors, the character of the promoter’s scheme was different than what it would be if all 
of the investors’ monies had been put together to finance the scheme). 
132 See supra note 108 (noting cases involving transactions that resulted in fraud). 
133 See supra Part II.A (discussing the historical business schemes that contributed to the 
need for federal regulation).  Note that the schemes discussed in Part II.A involved 
business structures of large size, which arguably contributed to their ability to hide 
material information investors needed to make accurate investment decisions.  See LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 5, at 4 (describing two companies so large, 
Mississippi Company and South Sea Company, that the British government granted them a 
monopoly over the shipping and trading industry). 
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disclosure.134  This analysis is consistent with Howey’s substance over 
form approach.135 
Furthermore, some argue horizontal commonality places too much 
value on the need for an investment scheme to utilize pooling of investor 
funds.136  As courts applying either of the vertical commonality 
approaches have illustrated, investment schemes that lack the pooling 
feature exist and, nonetheless, need to be regulated by mandatory 
disclosure.137  A promoter can easily circumvent the pooling requirement 
by simply keeping his investors’ monies separate from one another.138 
The mere use of preferred accounting techniques shares no 
correlation with the need for disclosure of information.139  Even more, a 
fraudulent investment scheme is no less worthy of regulation simply 
because the invested monies are compartmentalized.140  The inability of 
the horizontal commonality test to capture promoters crafty enough to 
keep investors’ monies separated, even though the essence of the scheme 
mirrors a common enterprise, renders the test overly restrictive.141 
                                                 
134 See supra note 43 (discussing Congress’s intent to mandate disclosure of material 
information). 
135 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).  The Court considered its approach to 
be one that “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of 
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use 
of the money of others on the promise of profits.”  Id. 
136 See Gordon III, supra note 69, at 91 (arguing that “horizontal commonality 
is . . . restrictive . . . [because it] excludes many instruments sold as investments”); 
Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156 (suggesting that “[h]orizontal commonality is also overly 
exclusive” because it places too great an emphasis on the pooling). 
137 See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 461 (3d Cir. 1982) (involving the resale of 
second trust deeds and second mortgages); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 
1978) (involving discretionary commodity trading accounts); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving a multi-level pyramid scheme); SEC v. 
Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving discretionary 
commodity trading accounts). 
138 See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1972) (recognizing 
that the investment scheme involved does not meet commonality because the promoter set 
up individual contracts with each investor thereby “creating [a] relationship [that] is 
unitary in nature” (quoting Milnarik, 320 F. Supp. at 1151–52)). 
139 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended to 
compel and regulate the disclosure of information, not monitor accounting practices). 
140 See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521 (finding commonality existed in a 
situation that involved a promoter who set up an individual account for each investor and 
made trades in commodities futures for one account irrespective of the other accounts). 
141 See supra note 127 (providing articles, which argue that horizontal commonality is 
overly restrictive). 
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B. The Inherent Redundancy in Broad Vertical Commonality 
If an individual investor’s fortunes are dependent upon the efforts of 
the promoter, the scheme in which the investor has joined meets broad 
vertical commonality and is an investment contract under the 1933 
Act.142  The test only requires that an investor rely on the promoter’s 
expertise, not that the investor be uneducated in the business for which 
he has invested.143  However, the test’s reliance on the promoter’s 
expertise seems to blend several prongs of the Howey test and place extra 
weight upon the investor’s reliance on the efforts and expertise of the 
promoter to produce returns on his investment.144  Even though some 
argue broad vertical commonality properly protects investors, it is clear 
the protection and the reasoning behind it are misguided. 
Congress may have intended to protect investors from fraudulent 
investment schemes, but it did not intend to protect investors from 
themselves.145  Even still, some commentators trumpet congressional 
intent while arguing that broad commonality penalizes knowledgeable 
                                                 
142 See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing broad vertical commonality). 
143 Cases discuss the increased need for federal protection when an investor is not 
knowledgeable about a given industry or business in which the investment scheme may 
operate, but no cases take the converse logical step of holding that a knowledgeable 
investor is precluded from relying on the expertise of a promoter.  See SEC v. W.J. Howey 
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1946) (noting that the investors that bought into the citrus grove 
lacked the requisite knowledge to cultivate and market the crops produced on their 
individual parcels of land).  This reasoning is grounded on the presumption that an 
uneducated investor is less capable of detecting fraudulent practices of the promoter.  Id.  
Moreover, it is precisely the efforts and expertise of the promoter that attract 
knowledgeable investors because the investor, although knowledgeable, may not have the 
ability, time, desire, or equipment to perform the necessary actions required to create a 
return on their investment.  See id. at 296 (noting that the investors involved were actually 
business and professional people).  Furthermore, the investor may be knowledgeable 
regarding the business in which the scheme operates, but it does not follow that the 
knowledge possessed by the investor includes the ability to detect fraud and manipulative 
practices of the promoter, especially if the promoter is keen in the art of deception.  Id.  It is 
the protection from deception that securities laws were designed to provide, not protection 
from losses suffered because a knowledgeable investor relied on an incompetent promoter.  
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting Congress during the promulgation of the 
1933 Act, “[t]he aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, 
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation”). 
144 See infra note 151 and accompanying text (providing the Second Circuit’s 
identification of the blending problem that occurs when broad vertical commonality is 
used). 
145 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating the purpose of the 
1933 and 1934 Acts was “to protect investors against fraud”); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & 
Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (stating that Congress intended “to protect the 
innocent investor, as distinguished from one who loses his innocence and waits to see how 
his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the act . . . .”). 
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investors to protect ignorant investors.146  Courts indicate that an 
investor satisfies the broad vertical commonality test if she lacks 
knowledge and experience in the underlying investment scheme.147  
However, the converse is not true in that a knowledgeable investor is not 
precluded from recovering losses incurred in a fraudulent investment 
scheme.148  So long as the knowledgeable investor relies on the 
promoter’s expertise in the given field, she too can recover.149  Therefore, 
broad commonality protects ignorant and knowledgeable investors 
alike.150 
Notwithstanding the knowledgeable investor argument, broad 
commonality is flawed because it reapplies the same reliance analysis 
already mandated by the fourth prong of the Howey test.151  The fourth 
prong requires that an investor rely solely on the efforts of others to 
make the desired return on investment.152  Implicit in this requirement is 
that an investor who relies on the efforts of someone else assumes that 
person has the requisite ability to generate a return.153  The promoter’s 
ability to generate return is fundamentally made up of his own 
knowledge of the given business environment, expertise in operating the 
investment scheme, and performance capabilities.154  As such, the fourth 
                                                 
146 See Alcser, supra note 69, at 1236–37 (inferring that because a court finds commonality 
in light of an investor’s lack of expertise it would not find commonality in light of an 
investor’s expertise). 
147 Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 142 (5th Cir. 1989). 
148 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 296 (noting that most of the investors in the citrus grove scheme 
were business and professional people).  The investors were thus knowledgeable regarding 
general business practices, but not specifically in the citrus industry.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
Court relied more on the fact that they lacked the desire, skill, and equipment necessary to 
actually work in the fields and market the fruits produced by cultivation.  Id. at 296, 299–
300. 
149 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ emphasis on investors 
relying on promoters’ expertise).  If an investor relies on the expertise of the promoter and 
an investor does not possess business acumen in the relevant industry, commonality will 
be found.  SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).  
150 See  supra Part III.B (discussing broad vertical commonality). 
151 See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that by 
allowing commonality to be satisfied by showing the fortunes of the investor are tied to the 
efforts of the promoter, the second and fourth prongs are simply combined into one 
question). 
152 See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of the Howey test). 
153 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300 (recognizing that in order for the investors to achieve 
their return on investment, it is essential for the promoter to possess the requisite 
capabilities to generate the expected profits). 
154 See id. (implying that promoters were able to sustain their operation because they 
possessed the necessary ability to cultivate and harvest citrus fruit and the ability to market 
the yielded crops to purchasers). 
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prong already incorporates weighing the degree of an investor’s reliance 
on the expertise of the promoter.155 
When promulgating the Howey test, the Court expressly dictated 
four separate requirements that must be present before an investment 
scheme can be classified as a security.156  Using broad commonality 
erodes the independent significance of the commonality element in favor 
of doubling the need to weigh an investor’s reliance on the promoter.157  
Had the Howey Court intended to place so much emphasis on the 
reliance among parties, it could have done so and not included a need to 
analyze the structural characteristics of the scheme.  Indeed, it is the 
substance of an investment scheme that separates those investment 
schemes that are worthy of regulation from those that are not.158  
Without a separate requirement of a common enterprise, many 
investment schemes not deserving of regulation would fall under the 
1933 Act.159  This results in the broad commonality being what its name 
suggests, broader than even Congress’s intended scope of the 1933 
Act.160 
                                                 
155 See supra Part II.D (outlining the fourth element of the Howey test). 
156 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (creating a four part test to determine whether an 
investment contract is a security). 
157 To be sure, consider the fact pattern in Koscot Interplanetary.  497 F.2d 473, 475–76 (5th 
Cir. 1974).  Individuals invested in the defendant’s multi-level pyramid scheme whereby 
the defendant promoter would sell the investor cosmetic merchandise at a discount price 
and encouraged the investor to recruit more investors to sell the discounted cosmetics to in 
turn.  Id. at 475–76.  The SEC brought suit to enjoin the defendant from marketing its 
scheme based on the fact that the promoter practiced fraudulent sales techniques including 
high-pressure sales seminars.  Id. at 474–75.  The case turned on whether or not the scheme 
utilized by the promoter was an investment contract, and thus a security within the reach 
of the 1933 Act.  Id. at 474.  Application of the Howey test revealed that there most definitely 
was an investment of money with an expectation of profiting in reliance solely on the 
efforts of others—satisfying prongs one, three, and four.  Id.  To determine if the scheme is 
a common enterprise—the second prong—the court then looked to whether the investor 
relied on the expertise and knowledge of the promoter.  Id. at 478–79.  In doing so, this was 
the court’s second pass at determining the degree of reliance the investor had on the 
promoter.  Id.  By inquiring into the investor’s reliance two times, the court placed an 
exaggerated amount of weight on the second and fourth prongs of Howey while at the same 
time deemphasizing the significance of the other prongs.  Id. 
158 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the substance over form 
approach outlined in Howey). 
159 See supra note 129 (noting Congress included a “private offering exemption” for 
situations involving a close relationship between the promoter and the investor).  Without 
a common enterprise requirement, investment schemes specifically exempted by Congress 
would nonetheless fall under federal protection.  See Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545 
F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977) (confronting the issue of applying securities to investment 
schemes between closely related parties). 
160 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (emphasizing that Congress 
placed some limitations on the broad scope of the 1933 Act).  The Court stated, “we are 
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C. The Inconsistencies of Strict Vertical Commonality 
At first glance, strict vertical commonality appears similar to 
horizontal commonality; however, the only thing shared is an inability to 
produce results consistent with the intent of Howey.  One reason for such 
results is that strict vertical commonality, more so than either of the two 
prior tests, places a higher value on form over substance—the antithesis 
of Howey.161  For any investment scheme to be classified as a security 
under strict vertical commonality, the investor’s fortunes must fluctuate 
in harmony with the promoter’s fortunes.162  In effect, it is only when the 
investor realizes a profit that the promoter too realizes a profit from the 
enterprise.163  Given that there is a multitude of ways a promoter could 
conceivably structure the compensation for his efforts, strict vertical 
commonality promotes form over substance.164  Moreover, by 
emphasizing an investment scheme’s form as it looks on paper, strict 
vertical commonality produces inconsistent results hinging on the 
promoter’s compensation structure as opposed to the economic realities 
driving the investment scheme.165 
An illustrative example of such a venture is a scheme whereby the 
promoter receives a percentage commission based on the performance of 
the enterprise.166  Assuming the other three prongs of Howey are met, 
such an arrangement would undoubtedly be the type Congress intended 
                                                                                                             
satisfied that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad 
federal remedy for all . . . .”  Id. 
161 See id. (stressing that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that the test ‘is what 
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of 
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect’” (quoting SEC v. C. 
M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943)). 
162 See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the 
strict vertical commonality test). 
163 This is unlike what occurs when a promoter structures his commission on a flat fee 
basis, thus allowing himself the ability to reap gains while the investor loses money.  Brodt 
v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978). 
164 See supra note 140 (describing a case involving a promoter that compartmentalized his 
investors’ accounts). 
165 See supra note 140 (describing one form of derivatives commodities accounts); see also 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (acknowledging that 
securities transactions are economic in character and for that reason, Congress intended the 
application of the 1933 Act to turn on the economic realities of the underlying investment 
scheme, not the form). 
166  SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991).  In Reynolds, the 
court held commonality existed because the promoter took a management fee based on a 
percentage of the profits created by the investment scheme.  Id. at 1130–31.  The court 
reasoned that because the promoter’s fortunes were contingent upon the fortunes of his 
investors, vertical commonality existed and the second prong of Howey was satisfied.  Id. at 
1131. 
Stegemoller: Refocusing Commonality: An Economic Approach that Shares Somethin
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
686 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
to classify as a security when it chose the phrase “investment 
contract.”167  However, in reality, a promoter can circumvent the 1933 
Act’s reach by structuring their business model to include a flat rate 
commission instead of a percentage basis.168  In doing so, the promoter 
would assure himself a monetary gain regardless of the investor’s 
financial outcome.169 
It is not the promoter’s gain or loss that triggers a need for investor 
protection; rather, it is the deceptive nature of the investment scheme, 
which necessitates disclosure.170  So, although the economic results of 
both a percentage based commission and flat rate commission differ 
slightly, the underlying financial product does not change.171  If, as in 
Brodt, the product is a commodities derivative, the investor will maintain 
the same level of risk while the promoter can deflect risk by utilizing a 
flat rate commission, which promotes form over substance.172 
The Court in Howey expressly denounced such an approach to 
analyzing an investment contract when it constructed a test that 
emphasized substance over form.173  Moreover, the Court mandated that 
lower courts look to the “economic realit[ies]” of the investment scheme 
to determine whether it is properly classified as an investment 
                                                 
167 Id.  The Reynolds court further found that, in addition to the commonality 
requirement, the investment scheme utilized by the promoter satisfied all prongs of Howey.  
Id. 
168 Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.  Unlike the promoter in Reynolds, the promoter in Brodt 
structured his compensation as a flat fee with no correlation to the fortunes of the investor.  
Id.  Moreover, the promoter could make large profits as he watched the money in his 
investors’ accounts be “wiped out.”  Id.  Although the investment schemes in both Reynolds 
and Brodt were similar, the promoter in the latter was able to side step liability because he 
structured his scheme on a flat fee commission basis as opposed to a percentage basis.  Id. 
169 See  SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving a 
promoter who utilized a flat fee rate system to make profits regardless of individual 
investors’ fortunes); see also Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (involving a promoter charging flat fees 
and reaped large profits while his investors suffered significant losses). 
170 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting Congress’s intent to protect the 
public and its markets from deceptive practices). 
171 Regardless of how the commission is structured, basic principles of economics suggest 
that a promoter will not offer services unless she is adequately compensated to 
accommodate the costs of rending the services sought by the consumer.  Cf. BARROWS & 
SMITHIN, supra note 102, at 22–26, 66–67 (discussing the relationship between the basic 
theory of supply and demand and the cost of production as they work in conjunction to 
define the market price of a product or service).  Thus, it can be assumed that a promoter 
utilizing a flat rate commission structure would demand an amount roughly equal to that 
which the promoter would garner under a percentage based commission structure.  Id. 
172 See supra note 168 (outing the flat fee scheme in Brodt). 
173 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting the flexibility of the Howey test). 
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contract.174  That being the case, strict vertical commonality ignores 
economic realities by allowing promoters to alter their risk on the surface 
while leaving the underlying product unchanged.175  Such an analysis 
does not protect investors in accord with the spirit of the 1933 Act 
because the true nature of the investment product, assuming it is 
deceptive, would go untested.176 
Another weakness of strict vertical commonality is the inconsistent 
results it may produce despite the economic realities behind an 
investment scheme.  Assume two separate investors invest in two 
separate schemes, each with an identical underlying business model—a 
commodities derivative—yet only the investor whose promoter takes a 
percentage based commission would receive federal protection.177  More 
currently, it is unlikely that promoters will structure their business 
models on a percentage basis.  Effectively, these types of schemes have 
been taken out of the 1933 Act’s regulatory reach, leaving those who 
invest in such schemes unprotected.178  Given that federal securities laws 
were introduced as a means of curing the inconsistencies of state’s blue 
                                                 
174 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (acknowledging the 
importance of economic realities when evaluating an investment contract for presence of 
commonality). 
175 See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding no commonality in 
a discretionary trading account solely because the promoter received a flat fee commission 
as opposed to a percentage based commission).  It can be inferred that had the promoter 
taken a percentage based commission, commonality would have been found even though 
the underlying investment scheme remained unchanged.  Id.  This is form over substance 
in violation of the Supreme Court’s guidance.  See supra note 135 (noting the doctrine of 
Howey to place substance over form). 
176 SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating “the spirit 
and purpose of . . . the 1933 Act . . . is ‘to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of 
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions’” (quoting SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953))).  The court in Harwyn was tasked with analyzing the 
unrelated practice of “spinning-off,” which consists of a company giving the subsidiaries 
stock to its parent company in an effort to avoid the registration requirement of the 1933 
Act.  Id. at 945.  Although “spinning-off” is unrelated to commonality, the Court 
nonetheless recognized that the spirit of the 1933 Act required companies to disclose 
pertinent information to investors for the sake of thwarting fraudulent practices in the 
marketplace.  Id. at 953 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 See supra note 157 (discussing a case in which the promoter of a discretionary trading 
account escaped commonality by charging a flat fee commission).  But see SEC v. Cont’l 
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that commonality existed in a 
discretionary trading account scheme). 
178 Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.  Investors participating in a scheme involving a flat rate 
commission are precluded from federal protection in jurisdictions utilizing strict vertical 
commonality.  Id.  However, investors in those jurisdictions, which subscribe to either 
broad vertical commonality or horizontal commonality, will likely be protected as the 
scheme will meet the requirements set forth by either test for commonality.  Cont’l 
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521. 
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sky laws, strict vertical commonality appears to ignore this overarching 
aim in favor of a more arbitrary approach that breathes new life into 
those inconsistencies.179 
Disharmony among the circuits regarding the choice of one 
commonality test is understandable given each circuit’s justifications.180  
However, all three tests fail to implement the intent of Howey to have one 
workable standard and the intent of Congress that securities laws be 
consistent throughout the nation.181  Horizontal commonality is flawed 
because it is overly restrictive and does not afford protection to classes of 
investors that Congress intended to protect.182  Broad vertical 
commonality also is flawed because it blends the third and fourth prong 
of the Howey test together, causing courts to give extra weight to an 
investor’s reliance on the promoter, thus devaluing the independent 
significance of the commonality element.183  Additionally, because strict 
vertical commonality places form over substance, it too is flawed.184  
Allowing three flawed tests to exist amongst the circuits will continue to 
cause inconsistent results, which is counter to the goal behind federal 
securities laws.185 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Given the problems that exist with each version of the commonality 
tests, it is clear that a fresh perspective on the matter is needed.186  
Suggesting that circuits should select one test over the other two is futile 
because, by now, each circuit is heavily entrenched and supportive of 
their chosen test.187  Simply combining the tests into a hybrid 
commonality test is impractical because there are irreconcilable 
differences amongst each commonality test regarding which investors 
                                                 
179 See supra Part II.B (outlining Congress’s first attempt to regulate securities on a federal 
level). 
180 See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing circuits that subscribe to horizontal commonality and 
their reasons for doing so); supra Part II.E.2 (noting the circuits that apply broad vertical 
commonality and their justifications); supra Part II.E.3 (detailing those circuits in favor of 
strict vertical commonality and the basis for their allegiance). 
181 See supra Part II.B (providing insight to Congress’s intent to stabilize securities 
regulation among the states and provide for a consistent federal regulatory scheme). 
182 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the weakness of horizontal commonality). 
183 See supra Part III.B (criticizing broad vertical commonality). 
184 See supra Part III.C (pointing out the inconsistent results produced by strict vertical 
commonality). 
185 See supra Part II.B (acknowledging that Congress wanted to create consistency among 
states regarding the regulation of securities). 
186 See supra Part III (critiquing each commonality test). 
187 See supra Part II.E (discussing each circuit’s preference for a particular commonality 
test). 
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would receive protection or not.188  This Part calls for a return to the 
original intent of both the Court and Congress while suggesting an 
economics based solution to identifying whether an investment contract 
has the requisite commonality to be considered a security. 
To be consistent with both the Court in Howey and Congress, any 
new test must be mindful of the intent of each.  According to Howey, 
such a test should be flexible enough to adapt to the rapidly innovative 
investment schemes that are created in the markets.189  Additionally, any 
commonality test should evaluate substance over form and dig deep to 
unearth the economic realities involved in a particular investment 
scheme.190  Furthermore, any commonality test should be consistent with 
Congress’s goal of protecting investors through disclosure and creating 
consistent results across the nation, as well as being broadly applicable to 
a wide range of investment schemes.191  Currently, each commonality 
test runs counter to one or a combination of these intentions.192 
To begin, a new commonality test should focus on whether the 
investment is made in a product that gains utility when developed as 
component parts of a larger whole.193  Utility means that the product 
would gain an economic purpose beyond or in addition to that which is 
present at the time of, or before, initial investment.194  This test can be 
referred to as the increased utility test.  Utility is essential if the investors 
are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investment.195  
Any intrinsic personal value or personal utility that exists when the 
product stands alone is inconsequential.  Additionally, for a product to 
be developed, the promoter must supply some type of effort to increase 
the product’s value.196  This piece of the test would most likely be met in 
                                                 
188 See Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156 (arguing for a hybrid commonality test). 
189  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see supra Part III.A and 
accompanying notes (discussing Howey’s intent). 
190 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. 
191 See supra note 53 (discussing the construction of federal securities laws and how 
Congress intended for the laws to be broadly applicable so as to cover as many financial 
instruments as possible). 
192 See supra Part III (critiquing each of the three current commonality tests). 
193 This proposed test is derived directly from Howey.  See Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (basing 
the Court’s reasoning on the principle that the underlying product gained utility once it 
was developed as component parts of a larger whole). 
194 Id. 
195 See id. (identifying the utility in that case as the adequacy of the personnel and 
equipment implemented by the promoter to create profits for investors). 
196 Unlike other commonality tests and the fourth prong of Howey, the increased utility 
test does not require that courts analyze the degree of reliance on the promoter’s efforts.  
See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the requirements of each broad vertical commonality); supra 
Part II.D (discussing the fourth element of Howey).  The test simply acknowledges the 
economic reality that some source of effort is required to increase the value of the 
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all challenges considering the nature of financial products involving 
investments. 
The increased utility test shifts the focus from the relationship 
between the promoter and the investor to the relationship between the 
underlying product and the larger enterprise.197  This is logical given the 
economic realities of investments:  Investors are primarily concerned 
with the value of the underlying product they are purchasing compared 
to the potential for an increase in that product’s future value.  Beyond 
the impact an investment scheme may have on the underlying product’s 
value, an investor would likely not be influenced by the structure so long 
as the promise of returns is present.  If the product incurs a new or 
increased economic purpose when combined within a larger system, it 
will satisfy the economic utility test and be classified as a common 
enterprise.198  The relationship between the promoter and the investor 
will not go unchecked as the fourth prong of Howey still mandates 
investor reliance on the promoter.199  This eliminates any issues of 
blending between the commonality element and the third party reliance 
element.200 
Take, for example, the orange groves involved in the Howey case.201  
The average plot for sale consisted of parcels slightly larger than one acre 
and each had approximately twenty to forty orange trees.202  Alone, this 
small amount of acreage will have little to no economic value—aside 
from the real estate value—to its owner because such a small number of 
cultivated oranges will produce negligible profits once cultivation 
expenses are deducted.203  In comparison, if the oranges from one small 
parcel, and the expenses involved in cultivating it, are combined with 
those of numerous, similarly situated owners, the owner of each small 
parcel now has potential for realizing an increase in economic value.  
The latter scenario creates a new economic purpose, which would be 
                                                                                                             
investment and that, in the spirit of Howey, the effort should come from the promoter.  
Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.  To require otherwise would defeat the purpose of investing in an 
investment scheme.  See supra Part II.D (discussing the four requirements of the Howey test, 
including an expectation of profits). 
197 See supra Part II.E (outlining each of the three current commonality tests, including the 
fact that each test frames its analysis in terms of the relationship between the promoter and 
the investor). 
198 See supra Part IV (laying forth the elements of the increased utility test). 
199 See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of the Howey test). 
200 See supra Part III.B (highlighting broad vertical commonality’s tendency to blend 
together the third and fourth prongs of the Howey test). 
201 Howey, 328 U.S. at 295. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 300.  The Court recognized that “individual development of the plots of land 
that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size.”  
Id. 
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large scale production and supply distribution as opposed to the original 
purpose of personal use and enjoyment.  Due to the economies of scale 
theory, the profits increase in relation to the number of owners involved 
in the enterprise.204  Therefore, the scheme involved in Howey would be a 
common enterprise under the increased utility test because the 
underlying product—small parcels of orange producing land—gained a 
new economic utility when combined with other similar parcels of 
orange producing land.205 
To further test the validity of the economic utility test, consider the 
discretionary commodity derivative accounts involved in both Milnarik 
v. M-S Commodities and SEC. v. Continental Commodities Corp.206  Both 
cases involved promoters who used investor accounts to make trades in 
commodities futures.207  Keeping in mind that the underlying 
commodities do qualify as securities, the question arises whether the 
agreements between the account holders and the promoters are 
considered securities.208  Intuition would indicate that a discretionary 
commodities account is not a security, and the increased utility test 
would agree.209  The initial value of buying into a discretionary 
commodity derivatives account is equal to the value after purchasing the 
                                                 
204 See FISHER, supra note 57, at 121 (providing the definition for the economies of scale 
theory).  Fisher states:   
Economies of scale . . . refers to a decrease in average cost as the 
quantity of output rises. . . . This concept of economies of scale is 
sometimes referred to as the advantage of joint consumption:  
individual consumers can reduce their costs by sharing the good and 
its total cost with others. 
Id. at 121–22. 
205 Under the horizontal commonality test, the facts of Howey were considered a common 
enterprise.  See supra Part II.D (discussing the facts, holding, and reasoning of SEC. v. 
Howey); supra Part II.E.1 (stating the horizontal commonality test).  If the same facts were 
analyzed under broad vertical commonality, it is likely that a common enterprise would be 
found because the investor’s fortunes are tied directly with the efforts of the promoter.  See 
supra Part II.E.2 (presenting elements of broad vertical commonality).  Also, because the 
profits of the investor are tied to the fortunes of the promoter on a percentage basis, the 
same facts would also qualify as a common enterprise under strict vertical commonality.  
See supra Part II.E.3 (presenting the development of strict vertical commonality). 
206 SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 518–19 (5th Cir. 1974); Milnarik v. M-S 
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1972).   
207 See supra note 206 (noting the importance of Milnarik and Continental Commodities 
Corp.). 
208 See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 520 n.9 (noting the importance of 
distinguishing between the underlying commodity and the discretionary trading accounts 
that deal in commodities). 
209 See Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 277 (declaring that the discretionary account scheme at bar 
resembled “an agency-for-hire rather than constituting the sale of a unit of a larger 
enterprise” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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account.210  The economic realities that drive an increase in value for the 
underlying commodities—and thus a profit for investors—are not the 
true “efforts” of the promoter, but the market value of each commodity 
in the portfolio.  Thus, although an investor’s account value may 
increase, it bears no relevance whether one investor’s account is part of a 
larger whole.  An independent discretionary commodity derivatives 
account, holding the same commodities as one involved in a large 
investment scheme, would see the same results simply due to market 
fluctuations.211  Therefore, the increased utility test would hold that 
discretionary commodity derivatives accounts are not securities. 
Both above examples prove that the increased utility test conforms to 
the intent of Howey and Congress.  First, the test is flexible because it 
allows courts to consider the individual facts of each case.  Orange 
groves and discretionary commodities accounts share no correlation, yet 
the increased utility test apply to both and produce principled results.  
Second, courts would not have to consider the different types of profit 
sharing agreements or accounting techniques, which have been designed 
to thwart current commonality tests.212  This allows the courts to focus on 
the economic realities that affect and result from the financial product in 
question as opposed to focusing on the form of each agreement.  
Additionally, the increased utility test meets Congress’s intent because it 
can be broadly used on a variety of investment schemes from the known, 
such as discretionary commodity accounts and fractional agricultural 
ownership, to the unknown types yet to be conceived by the 
unscrupulous.  Given its ability to handle innovative investment 
schemes within the intent of both Howey and Congress, the increased 
utility test is a more applicable test capable of producing consistent 
results. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current state of commonality jurisprudence is inconsistent and 
in need of a fresh perspective.213  Circuits across the country have 
differed as to which of the three commonality tests is more capable of 
                                                 
210 This is to be distinguished from the initial value of the commodities in the account 
versus the future value of said commodities.  Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522. 
211 This assumes the promoter makes identical portfolio choices for each account.  See 
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275 (involving an investment scheme that consisted of one promoter 
making varying trades on separate and individual accounts). 
212 See supra Part III.C (examining different investment schemes that keep investor 
accounts separate so as to not trigger broad vertical commonality). 
213 See supra Part II.F (noting the current disarray among the circuits regarding which 
aspects of the three available commonality tests are best for evaluating an investment 
contract). 
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accurately assessing whether a financial product has the requisite 
characteristics to be considered a common enterprise.214  Such a 
disagreement among the circuits has and will continue to cause the same 
investment scheme to be a security in one jurisdiction but not a security 
in others.215  This problem runs absolutely counter to the very aims of 
federal securities law. 
Each commonality test is a product of creative legal thinking, but 
that process has taken each test far away from the original analysis 
principled in Howey.  Each test is flawed:  horizontal commonality is 
overly restrictive; broad vertical commonality blends the third and 
fourth prongs of the Howey test together; and strict vertical commonality 
values form over substance.216  A new, economic-based, approach would 
refocus the commonality analysis to the most important factors, which 
are the economic realities.  The proposed increased utility test does this 
by shifting the focus from the relationship between investors and 
promoters to the underlying reasons the investor initially placed his 
money in an investment scheme.  If the reasons were to increase the 
economic purpose of the underlying product by incorporating it into a 
large whole, then the overarching investment scheme is a common 
enterprise.  This analysis, coupled with the flexibility of the proposed 
test, make it a viable solution to the current commonality conundrum. 
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, Lucas subsequently 
seeks counsel from an attorney in hopes that he can recover his 
investment from the fraudulent Zibby Star Gazer promoters.  The 
attorney will inevitably encounter the Howey test and question whether 
the investment scheme Lucas entered into was a common enterprise.217  
If Lucas’s case is heard in a horizontal commonality jurisdiction, he will 
not be able to recover because his success is not tied to the success of 
other investors.218  If the jurisdiction follows strict vertical commonality, 
                                                 
214 See supra Part II.F (summarizing the circuit splits regarding commonality tests). 
215 Compare Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275 (holding that discretionary commodities accounts 
were not securities), with Cont’l Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522 (holding the discretionary 
commodities accounts were securities). 
216 See supra Part III (criticizing each commonality test). 
217 The attorney will conclude that Lucas’s investment meets the remaining three criteria:  
He made an investment of money, with an expectation of profit, and relied on the efforts of 
others.  See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of Howey). 
218 This is because the profits Lucas would receive are derived solely from the cultivation 
and distribution of bulbs grown specifically in his parcel.  See supra Part I (describing the 
structure of the financial product involved).  Recovery is based on the assumption that all 
other elements necessary for recovery are met, such as 10b-5 fraud and an investment of 
money with the expectation of profits derived from the efforts of a third party.  See supra 
Part II.D (discussing the remaining elements of Howey); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) 
(outlining the statutory requirements for establishing a securities fraud claim); 17 C.F.R. 
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Lucas will also be unsuccessful in recovering because the promoter can 
still reap profits from other successful parcels even though Lucas may 
not see success in his own parcel.  However, if Lucas is fortunate enough 
to have his case heard in a jurisdiction that applies broad vertical 
commonality, he will be able to recover because his fortunes are tied 
directly to the efforts of the promoter.  The federal securities laws did not 
intend to let the fortunes of individual investors turn on the location of 
their trial.  If that were the intention, Congress would have left securities 
regulation to the already established blue sky laws.219 
Lucas would be better served if all jurisdictions followed the 
increased utility test.  Under this proposed test, Lucas would likely be 
able to recover because the underlying product—the small parcel of land 
where Zibby Star Gazer bulbs would be cultivated—would only gain a 
new economic purpose if it were combined with those of similar 
characteristics.  When the small parcel is combined with a larger whole, 
it shares in the benefits of economies of scale and thus Lucas would 
receive profits derived therefrom.  This economic purpose is in addition 
to the independent value the bulbs would have if Lucas cultivated the 
land himself and sold the bulbs at a local farmer’s market.  Because 
Lucas’s small parcel gains an additional economic purpose, separate 
from any relationship between his failure and the success of the 
promoter or other similarly situated investors, the investment scheme 
Lucas invested in is a common enterprise, deserving of protection under 
federal securities laws.220  This result seems more appropriate given 
                                                                                                             
§ 240.10b-5 (2010) (promulgating the requirements one must satisfy to bring a securities 
fraud claim).  The requirements for a 10b-5 claim are:   
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
219 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 11–12 (noting the state-by-
state approach to securities regulation that produced inconsistent results depending on the 
state in which a case was heard). 
220 See supra note 175 (stating that this reasoning is consistent with the foundational 
principle in Howey).  In addition to being a common enterprise under the increased utility 
test, Lucas made an investment of money with an expectation of profits derived from the 
efforts of a third party.  As such, his investment in the investment scheme meets the Howey 
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Lucas is unlikely to be in a leveraged bargaining position to demand the 
necessary information from the promoter he would need to discover that 
Zibby Star Gazers are really man-made.  The increased utility test would 
allow Lucas to recoup his investment from the fraudulent investment 
scheme and give him a second chance to use that money more wisely:  
on next year’s gift for Mother’s Day. 
Travis Stegemoller* 
                                                                                                             
test and would be classified as a security under the 1933 Act.   SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
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